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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the modern rule is that under it a venomous publisher "could with im-
munity print a large number of extra copies of an issue containing
libelous matter, retain them on hand and from time to time through
the years mail them to members of the general public."'1  This, it is
urged, would be a part of the original publication and, as such, would
not amount to another tort.
This argument, though weighty, would seem to be more concerned
with the applicability than the validity of the single publication doctrine.
It is to be remembered that this new theory of liability finds its basic
justification in the fact that it protects the publisher or distributor of
integrity from the legal hazards arising out of mass distribution of his
printed matter.19 This justification is lost in the case of a malicious
defendant who persists in circulating the libelous matter for the sake
of the libel itself and not as a usual business practice,2 0 and the bene-
ficial single tort rule would appear inapplicable. In such a case, the
single publication court could hold with consistence that the further
malicious act of distribution, not occurring in the ordinary course of
business, amounts to a new publication and a new tort.
RoBRT PERRY, JR.
Negligence-Per Se or Evidence of-Violation of Statute as
In a recent case' plaintiff's decedent was killed by defendant's truck.
In an action brought to recover for the death, defendant claimed that
plaintiff's decedent was contributorily negligent in that at the time of
his death he was violating a statute requiring pedestrians to walk on
the left-hand side of any highway.2 Held: Plaintiff's decedent's viola-
tion of the statute did not make him contributorily negligent per se and
the question of his contributory negligence was for the jury.
Negligence is the failure to comply with the legal standard of care
"Winrod v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249, 251 (N. D. Ill.
1945).
" Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E. D. Pa. 1946) ("There is
discernible . . . a reluctance among the modem courts to apply that law (of
multiple tort liability) when confronted with a controvery involving large dis-
tributions of printed matter such as are made by present day newspaper and mag-
azine publishers."); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E.' 2d 708
(1948).
20 See Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 65, 78 N. E. 2d 708, 710 (1948)
("... no new cause of action will accrue if the subsequent distribution is reason-
ably connected, by trade practice relating to the type of printed matter involved,
to the original distribution. .. ").
'Lewis v. Watson, 229 N. C. 20, 47 S. E. 2d 484 (1948).
2N. C. GENt. STAT. §20-174 (1943): "It shall be unlawful for pedestrians to
walk along the traveled portion of any highway except on the extreme left-hand
side thereof, and such pedestrians shall yield the right-of-way to approaching
traffic."
R .ESTATEMENT, TORTS §284 (1934) ; HARPER ON TORTS §§68, 69 (1933) ; CLERK
& LINDSELL ON TORTS §§12, 13 (7th ed., Wyatt-Paine, 1921) ; Moore v. Chicago
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
which standard may be either established by common law principles or
by statute.4 Logically then, the violation of a statute designed to pro-
tect persons or property should constitute negligence without more.
Many courts have so held 5 and it has been the rule in North Carolina
for some time that such is negligence per se.6 However, some decisions
Iron Works, 183 N. C. 438, 111 S. E. 776 (1922) ; Patton v. Atlantic C. L. R. R.,
197 N. C. 17, 147 S. E. 698 (1929) ; Helms v. Citizens Light & Power Co., 192
N. C. 784, 136 S. E. 9 (1926) ; Saunders v. Southern Ry., 167 N. C. 375, 83 S. E._
573 (1914).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS §285, comments b and c (1934); CLARK, THE LAW OF
TORTS §100 (1926) ; PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (1941) ; see
also, for a good statement, Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105, 41 N. W.
543 (1889). It is to be noted that, as used in this Note, negligence includes con-
tributory negligence and statute includes ordinance.
'Ward v. Cathey, 210 S. W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (ordinance forbidding
autos to pass standing street-car); Opitz v. Schenck, 178 Cal. 636, 174 Pac. 40
(1918) (speed limit set by ordinance) ; Wright v. Salzberger & Son, 63 Cal. App.
450, 218 Pac. 785 (1923) (ordinance forbidding coasting); Riser v. Smith, 136
Minn. 417, 162 N. W. 520 (1917) (speeding ordinance); Amberg v. Kinley, 214
N. Y. 531, 108 N. E. 830 (1915) (statute requiring fire escape) ; Annis v. Britton,
232 Mich. 291, 205 N. W. 128 (1925) (housing statutes) ; Fox v. Bearekman, 178
Ind. 572, 99 N. E. 989 (1912) (speed statute).
'Leathers v. Durham Tobacco Co., 144 N. C. 330, 57 S. E. 11 (1907) (statute
prohibiting employment of children under 12 years of age in factories) ; Starnes
v. Albion Mfg. Co., 147 N. C. 556, 61 S. E. 525 (1908) (statute forbidding em-
ployment of children under 12 years of age in factories) ; Rich v. Asheville Elec.
Co., 152 N. C. 689, 68 S. E. 232 (1910) (statute requiring street passenger railway
companies to use vestibule fronts on passenger cars) ; Paul v. Atlantic C. L. R. R.,
170 N. C. 230, 87 S. E. 66 (1915) (ordinance forbidding blocking of street by
railroads for more than five minutes) ; Zageir v. Southern Express Co., 171 N. C.
692, 89 S. E. 43 (1916) (ordinance requiring license for car) ; Taylor v. Stewart,
172 N. C. 203, 90 S. E. 134 (1916) (statute prohibiting persons under 16 years of
age from driving autos upon highway); Godfrey v. Queen City Coach Co., 201
N. C. 264, 159 S. E. 412 (1931) (speed statute) ; King v. Pope, 202 N. C. 554,
163 S. E. 447 (1932) (statutes prohibiting reckless driving, setting speed restric-
tions, requiring that driving be upon right-hand side of highway) ; Ham v. Greens-
boro Ice & Fuel Co., 204 N. C. 614, 169 S. E. 180 (1933) (ordinances requiring
license to operate truck, parking parallel to curb and prohibiting backing in city
street); Johnson v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 205 N. C. 127, 170 S. E. 120 (1933)
(ordinance regulating speed of trains in city limits); Sherwood v. Southeastern
Express Co., 206 N. C. 243, 173 S. E. 605 (1934) (ordinance prohibiting backing
of motor vehicle in street); Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311
(1939) (statute requiring person, before stopping motor vehicle on highway, to
determine whether he can safely do so) ; Williams v. Woodward, 218 N. C. 305,
10 S. E. 2d 913 (1940) (statute providing that vehicles be operated on right-hand
side of highway and that warning be given pedestrians) ; Miller v. Lewis & Holmes
Motor Freight Corp., 218 N. C. 464, 11 S. E. 2d 300 (1940) (statute requiring
that pedestrians walk on left-hand side of highway) ; Tarrant v. Pepsi Cola Bot-
tling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. 2d 565 (1942) (statute prohibiting driving upon
highway at greater speed than is reasonable or prudent). In Leathers v. Durham
Tobacco Co., supra, the court quoted with approval the following from I THomp-
SON ON NEGLIGENcE §10: "When the legislature [or city council], having in view
the promotion of the safety of the public or of individual members of the public,
commands or forbids the doing of a particular act, . . . a failure to do the act
commanded, or doing the act prohibited is negligence as a mere matter of law,
otherwise negligence per se; and this, irrespective of all questions of the exercise
of prudence, diligence, care, or skill. So that if it is the proximate cause of hurt
or damage to another, and if that other is without contributory fault, the case is
decided in his favor. . . " The court further quoted with approval from I
STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LiABxrir §172 (1906): "The violation of an
19491
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have seemed to deviate from this position by saying that such violation
is only evidence of negligence.7 For example, in Henderson v. Durhamn
Traction Co.8 where violation of a statute requiring street railways to
use fenders in front of their cars was held to be evidence of negligence,
it was said: "The element of proximate cause must be established and
it will not necessarily be presumed from the fact that a statute or city
ordinance has been violated. Negligence . . . can not result in a right
of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of
by the plaintiff."9  On the other hand, in Ham v. Greensboro Ice and
Fuel Co.10 where the violation of a city ordinance requiring parking
of trucks at the curb was held to be negligence per se, the court said:
"All the decisions of this state since (1913) concur in the view that
the violation of an ordinance or statute . . . is negligence per se. Not-
withstanding, the same decisions do not permit recovery.., unless there
was a causal relation between the violation and the injury.""
imposed statutory duty is a sort of negligence per se ... and the sole question
to be settled in cases of this kind is whether that delinquency can be considered
a proximate cause of the damage of which complaint is made."
Edwards v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 129 N. C. 78, 39 S. E. 730 (1901) (ordi-
nance regulating speed of trains within city) ; Henderson v. Durham Traction Co.,
132 N. C. 779, 44 S. E. 598 (1903) (statute requiring street passenger railway
companies to have fenders on front of all cars run); Duval v. East Carolina
R. R., 134 N. C. 331, 46 S. E. 750 (1904) (contract by defendant with city to
limit speed of its trains, which contract was similar to ordinance) ; Templeton v.
Kelley, 215 N. C. 577, 2 S. E. 2d 696 (1939) (statute prohibiting pedestrians'
crossing at other places than marked cross-walk between adjacent intersections
which have traffic control signals in operation) ; Gaskins v. Kelly, 228 N. C. 697,
47 S. E. 2d 34 (1948) (statute requiring pedestrians to yield right-of-way to all
vehicles when crossing road at point other than marked cross-walks or within
unmarked cross-walks at intersections) ; Ward v. Bowles, 228 N. C. 273, 45 S. E.
2d 354 (1947) (statute prohibiting "cutting corners" when turning auto at inter-
section).
a 132 N. C. 779, 44 S. E. 598 (1903).
' Id. at 784 (italics supplied). To the same effect, see Duval v. Atlantic C. L.
R. R., 129 N. C. 78, 39 S. E. 730 (1901), where it was held that violation of a
contract by the defendant which it had with the City of New Bern to limit the
speed of its trains through the streets of said city was evidence of negligence, the
court said: "It (i.e., the contract) was similar to an ordinance, in purpose and
legal effect at least, in civil actions. We do not feel compelled in this case to go
to the extent of saying that the violation . . . gives rise to a cause of acton; but
we hold that, equally with the violation of an ordinance, it is evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant" (italics supplied).
20 204 N. C. 614, 169 S. E. 180 (1933).
" Id. at 617 (italics supplied). See also, Paul v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 170 N. C.
230, 87 S. E. 66 (1915) ; Rich v. Asheville Elec. Co., 152 N. C. 689, 68 S. E. 232
(1910) ; Godfrey v. Queen City Coach Co., 201 N. C. 264, 159 S. E. 412 (1931) ;
Norfleet v. Hall, 204 N. C. 573, 169 S. E. 143 (1933) ; James v. Carolina Coach
Co., 207 N. C. 742, 178 S. E. 607 (1935) ; Leathers v. Durham Tobacco Co., 144
N. C. 330, 57 S. E. 11 (1907); Starnes v. Albion Mfg. Co., 147 N. C. 556, 61
S. E. 525 (1908) ; Zageir v. Southern Express Co., 171 N. C. 692, 89 S. E. 43
(1916); King v. Pope, 202 N. C. 554, 163 S. E. 447 (1932) ; Taylor v. Stewart,
172 N. C. 203, 90 S. E. 134 (1916) ; Johnson v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 205 N. C.
127, 170 S. E. 120 (1933) ; Sherwood v. Southeastern Express Co., 206 N. C. 243,
173 S. E. 605 (1934) ; Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311 (1939) ;
Williams v. Woodward, 218 N. C. 305, 10 S. E. 2d 913 (1940); Tarrant v. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. 2d 565 (1942).
NOTES AND COM1IMENTS
An examination of the language of these two cases demonstrates
that when the court says that violation of a statute is evidence of negli-
gence, it is using a broader concept of negligence than when it says
that such is negligence per se. In the former instance its concept in-
cludes both breach of a legal standard of care and the element of
proximate cause. In the latter it contains only the breach of a legal
standard of care. In the differing content of these concepts lies the
explanation of the court's use of the different terminologies. If the
court is thinking of the broader concept of negligence it will say that
violation of a statute is evidence of negligence. Its reasoning in such a
case is that since its concept of negligence includes proximate cause and
since proximate cause is not attendant upon every breach of a statutory
standard of care, an element of its concept of negligence may be miss-
ing. Therefore, the court does not feel free to summarily say that the
whole concept is present and that the violation is negligence per se.
However, if the court is thinking of the narrower concept of negligence
it will say that the violation of a statute is negligence per se because
the narrower concept includes only breach of a legal standard of care
and the violation of a statute readily furnishes that element.
This difference in what the court says carries over into what it does.
In all these cases' 5 both breach of a statute and a proximately caused
injury were prerequisites to recovery. However, the presence of these
elements is ascertained differently depending upon whether the court
says that violation of a statute is evidence of negligence or negligence
per se. Since proximate cause includes questions of public policy, stat-
utory interpretation, and actual causation, 13 it is apparent that no part of
the problem of proximate cause can properly be submitted to the jury
except that of actual causation. Nevertheless, in the principal case1
4
the following issue was submitted to the jury--"Did the lpaintiff's intes-
tate, by his own negligence, contribute to his death, as alleged in the
answer?" This issue included questions of negligence and proximate
cause mingled together and was approved on appeal. The submission
of such double barreled issues allows matters to be determined by the
jury which are properly for the court, such as whether the injured per-
son was a member of the class of persons which the statute was designed
to protect and whether the injury was one of the sort which the statute
was designed to prevent.
It is suggested that this abdication by the court of its proper func-
tions could be eliminated in this way: When the court is faced with
violation of a statute designed to protect persons or property it should
11 See notes 6 and 7 supra.23 GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
' See note 1 supra.
1949]
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say that the violator is negligent per se, for which holding it has ample
precedent.' 5 The question then left to be answered would be whether
the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. The court should,
in answering this question, determine at the outset, by interpretation of
the statute involved, whether the injured party belongs to the class of
persons which the statute was designed to protect and whether the in-
jury which has occurred is one of the sort which the statute was designed
to prevent. If the court finds that the answer to either of these questions
is in the negative, it should rule, as a matter of law, that the violation
was not the proximate cause of the injury. If the court finds that the
injured person is a member of the class of persons which the statute
was designed to protect and that the injury which has occurred is of
the sort which the statute was designed to prevent, there remain two
questions; namely, whether the party violated the statute and whether
the act of the party which violated the statute actually caused the injury
of which complaint is made. If more than one inference can reasonably
be drawn as to the answer to either of these two questions, it should be
submitted to the jury for their finding as to which inference should be
drawn.
MAX OLIVER COGBURN.
Taxation of Income-Dividends in Kind-Corporation's Liability
In a recent case' before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the taxpayer corporation held certain notes which had been
charged off as wholly worthless and deducted as bad debts in previous
income tax returns. In 1942, when it became apparent that some of
the notes could be collected, the notes were declared as a dividend in
kind and distributed to the stockholders. No value was placed on the
notes by the corporation. The commissioner determined that the amount
collected by the stockholders on the dividend notes was taxable as in-
come to the corporation. The Tax Court reversed the commissioner,
holding that a corporation does not realize income by its distribution of
a dividend in kind.2 The circuit court of appeals reversed the Tax
Court. It held that the amount collected on the notes was income to
the extent of the tax benefit received on account of the deductions
previously allowed and was taxable to the corporation under the assign-
ment of expectant income theory.
The taxpayer and the Tax Court relied on General Utilities &
Operating Co. v. Helvering for the proposition that a corporation does
"5 See note 6 supra.
1 Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F. 2d 1004 (C. C. A.
5th 1948).
'First State Bank of Stratford, 8 T. C. 831 (1947).
S296 U. S. 200 (1935).
[Vol. 27
